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Events during the bicentennial year of the United States Constitution
focused America's attention on the way in which that document both
authorizes and structures an ongoing institutional struggle for domi-
nance in the realm of foreign affairs. As the year progressed, constitu-
tional clashes between the President and Congress spilled across the
spectrum of U.S. foreign policymaking-covert operations, warmaking,
arms control, foreign assistance, immigration, international human
rights, emergency economic power, and international trade-even as
those clashes marched across the front pages of the New York Times.
The term "Iran-Contra affair" alone came to encompass a welter of stat-
utory and constitutional disputes over the legal rights and duties of all
three branches of the federal government: over the National Security
Council's legal authority to conduct covert operations and the Presi-
dent's constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed; over Congress' constitutional authority to condition its power
of the purse and its statutory right to be notified and consulted about
arms sales and intelligence operations; and over the federal judiciary's
constitutional authority to appoint special prosecutors and its duty to
adjudicate or abstain in lawsuits engendered by foreign policy crises.
At only slightly lower volume, the constitutional colloquy over other
foreign relations questions shifted from forum to forum and from con-
frontational to cooperative mode. While Congress debated whether to
support a policy of U.S. naval protection of neutral tankers in the Persian
Gulf, congressmen sued in federal court to force the President to ac-
knowledge the War Powers Resolution's application to that situation.'
t Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. See Lowry v. Reagan, 56 U.S.L.W. 2376 (D.D.C. 1987) (dismissing the complaint).
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The contest between the Legal Adviser to the State Department and the
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee over the compatibil-
ity of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with the Strategic Defense
Initiative cast its shadow upon the Senate's advice and consent to the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces treaty, which was signed in the waning
days of the bicentennial year.2 Questions about the constitutionality of
various legislative constraints upon presidential trade management
hovered over congressional consideration of an omnibus international
trade bill and the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. 3 At
times, even the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on the confirmation
of Robert Bork as an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court became a constitutional seminar on the respective roles of individ-
ual rights, the courts, Congress, and the President in the conduct of our
nation's foreign affairs.4
Almost without exception, the antagonists in these bicentennial con-
troversies conceded that constitutional law matters in foreign affairs; far
from denying the relevance of that body of law to their conduct, most of
them expressly invoked its support.5 But even if the institutional com-
batants have traditionally understood that constitutional law matters in
2. Treaty Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed Dec. 8, 1987. 23
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1459 (Dec. 8, 1987). Compare Nunn, The ABM Reinterpretation
Issue, 10 WAsH. Q. 45 (Autumn 1987), with Sofaer, The ABM Treaty: Legal Debate in the
Political Cauldron, 10 WASH. Q. 59 (Autumn 1987).
3. For a discussion of some of these questions, see Koh, The Legal Markets of Interna-
tional Trade: A Perspective on the Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12
YALE J. INT'L L. 193, 201-18 (1987).
4. That Judge Bork's elevation would have profoundly affected the institutional balance of
power in foreign affairs emerged from his publicly stated pro-Executive views on war powers,
foreign intelligence, national security, and the unconstitutionality of congressional standing
and the Independent Counsel Act. The impact a Justice Bork would have had is suggested by
two D.C. Circuit decisions under review in the Supreme Court's 1987 Term. See Abourezk v.
Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 108 S. Ct. 252
(1987) (upholding, over Judge Bork's dissent, a challenge to the administration of the visa
denial provisions of the McGovern Amendment to the McCarran-Walter Act); Finzer v.
Barry, 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. granted sub nom. Boos v. Barry, 107 S. Ct. 1282
(1987) (opinion by Judge Bork upholding constitutionality of District of Columbia statute
banning hostile picketing near foreign embassies). In each case, Judge Bork favored executive
prerogative in foreign affairs over claims of individual right.
5. The exception, of course, was National Security Council staff secretary Fawn Hall, who
told the congressional committees investigating the Iran-Contra affair that sometimes in the
conduct of foreign policy, the President must obey a law higher than the Constitution. Far
more typical, however, was Lt. Colonel Oliver North, who claimed that "[w]ithin the limits of
the constitutional authority to prosecute the foreign policy of the United States, the President
has a very wide mandate to carry out activities secretly or publicly, as he chooses.... I do not
believe that the things that we did .... were in any way prohibited .... " 0. NORTH, TAKING
THE STAND 523, 525 (1987) (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936)).
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foreign affairs, what they have comprehended far less clearly is what that
constitutional law is.
At the heart of the problem lies the Constitution's astonishing textual
brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority and obliga-
tions among the branches. Far from resolving most debates over which
institution may take the lead in the conduct of foreign affairs, reference
to the constitutional text merely opens them.6 To fill the textual silences,
the President and Congress have invariably turned to judicial precedent
and quasi-constitutional "custom"' 7 to find support for their claims of
constitutional right. Yet both judicial precedent and institutional prac-
tice have their own limitations as reliable sources of foreign relations law.
The judicial precedents are not only sparse, but tend to employ sweeping
language that renders them subject to multiple and self-serving interpre-
tation.8 Studies of congressional and executive practice in foreign affairs,
like studies of state practice in international law, often fail to reveal
6. As Professor Henkin has noted, "[T]he constitutional blueprint has proved to be unclear
and incomplete as regards foreign affairs and there is no agreed guiding principle to help make
its provisions clear, or to fill the lacunae." Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66
FOR. AFF. 284, 285 (Winter 1987/88).
7. Under the heading of "quasi-constitutional custom," I would of course include execu-
tive practice of which Congress has approved or in which it has acquiesced. See Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("[A]
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and
never before questioned,... making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure of
our government, may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § I
of Art. II."). See generally Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. Rnv. 109 (1984). But the category of "customary constitutional law"
could just as easily embrace "constitutional 'framework' legislation which interprets the Con-
stitution by providing a legal framework for the governmental decision-making process." Cas-
per, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial
Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 482 (1976) (citation omitted). Some framework statutes, such
as the War Powers Resolution, may be of dubious constitutionality. But the extent to which
the President has historically complied with some of the Resolution's provisions, particularly
the reporting requirements, has bolstered Congress' claim that those provisions are constitu-
tional. See Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 VA. L. REV: 101,
104 & n.17 (1984). Finally, some of the most frequently cited customary "norms" in the for-
eign affairs realm have emerged from receit lower court judicial opinions that have ruled on
the merits of a foreign affairs claim, but then been vacated by the Supreme Court on proce-
dural grounds. See, e.g. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub
nom. Burke v. Barnes, 107 S. Ct. 734 (1987); Ramirez v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir.
1984), vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of subsequent legislation, 105 S. Ct.
2353 (1985); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir.), vacated and remanded with direc-
tions to dismiss the complaint, 444 U.S. 997 (1979). Although strictly speaking, those vacated
opinions have no precedential weight, the President and Congress frequently cite them against
one another as predictions of how a court would rule if a particular constitutional claim were
to arise again in the future.
8. The most famous example is Justice Sutherland's sweeping description of the "very deli-
cate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government
in the field of international relations .... United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 320 (1936), a quotation popularly known among some government lawyers as the
"'Curtiss-Wright, so I'm right' cite." Cf supra note 5.
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whether and when national institutions act out of a sense of political pru-
dence, as opposed to legal constraint.
In recent years, this Journal has examined the law-shaping force of
numerous international "incidents", "regarding ... the incident as a ba-
sis for the systematic observation and generalized understanding of inter-
national law as a distinctive type of law." 9 The five articles in this Focus
section carry forth this tradition in the constitutional realm, by exploring
the ways in which interpretations of constitutional text, judicial prece-
dent, and quasi-constitutional custom shape and are shaped by specific
U.S. foreign policy initiatives. In Two Views of Presidential Foreign Af-
fairs Power, Professor Glennon begins this exploration with an analysis
of two leading Supreme Court decisions that set forth competing under-
standings of the exclusive and concurrent constitutional powers of the
President and Congress; he reviews the claim that the President possesses
a plenary unenumerated foreign affairs power and finds it wanting. Jef-
frey Meyer's Congressional Control of Foreign Assistance and Tanya
Broder's and Bernard Lambek's Military Aid to Guatemala describe the
constitutional and statutory distribution of institutional authority over
foreign economic and military aid. Both articles review the control de-
vices by which Congress has attempted to maintain its oversight role in
this area and the techniques that the Presidency has successfully devel-
oped to evade each of these devices. The two remaining articles inquire
into the power of constitutional rights, with and without judicial enforce-
ment, to check institutional prerogatives. Edward Tanzman, in Constitu-
tionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United
States, explains how the Fourth Amendment might restrict the United
States' freedom to offer and enforce on-site inspection provisions in arms
control treaties. The author concludes by suggesting technological, con-
tractual, and legislative solutions that might minimize this conflict. Fi-
nally, in Economic Sanctions, Domestic Deprivations, and the Just
Compensation Clause, Alexander Cohen and Joseph Ravitch urge courts
to enforce the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
award redress to individual American citizens who have suffered losses
abroad from international emergency economic measures imposed by the
Executive to benefit the nation as a whole. All five articles ultimately
address the same question raised, but left unanswered, by all of the events
of the Constitution's bicentennial year: By what means shall we subject
presidential action in the foreign affairs realm to the rule of law?
9. Falk, The Validity of the Incidents Genre, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 376, 376 (1987), review-
ing Special Feature-The Incident as a Decisional Unit in InternationalLaw, 10 YALE J. INT'L
L. 117 (1984).
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